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Streamlining Breach & Incident Reporting under the EU Digital Legislative Framework

EFDPO Statement on the Council’s Negotiating Position regarding the Digital Omnibus Simplification Package

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The European Federation of Data Protection Officers (EFDPO) comments on the Council’s negotiating position on the Digital Omnibus Simplification Package and assesses its proposed changes.

Date: October 2026
Subject: Response to the Council of the EU’s Negotiating Mandate on the Simplification of Data Protection, Privacy, and Cyber Reporting Rules (“Digital Omnibus”)

Executive Summary

The European Federation of Data Protection Officers (EFDPO), representing Data Protection Officers (DPOs) and privacy professionals across the European Union, warmly welcomes the negotiating position agreed upon by the Council of the European Union on 21 October 2026 regarding the proposal to simplify and streamline data protection, privacy, and cybersecurity rules.

The EFDPO fully supports the EU’s simplification agenda (“Omnibus VII”) aimed at enhancing European competitiveness and reducing administrative friction while preserving fundamental privacy rights and high standards of data protection. Nevertheless, we believe that, in achieving these objectives, the Omnibus proposal represents something of a missed opportunity. In particular, in terms of its design as future-proof regulation, we believe that it responds to past problems rather than establishing (at least) a flexible procedural regulatory framework for possible future developments.

The provisions concerning artificial intelligence are one example. Although they partly respond to issues associated with the training of large LLMs (which, moreover, have often already been trained on the relevant data by non-European providers, so the practical reach of the exemptions will be rather limited), they provide neither answers nor regulatory frameworks for emerging trends such as Recursive Self-Improvement, possible future Artificial General Intelligence or (albeit somewhat outside the field of personal data protection) the use of AI systems in cybersecurity (whether for attacks or for defence against them).

It may therefore very easily happen that, by the time the proposed amendments take effect, they will already be incapable of positively influencing current trends and processes. If the EU does not wish to abandon its “regulation-first” approach, it must be able to ensure that such regulation is at least adopted swiftly and responds promptly to current technological trends. It would therefore be appropriate, both for the purposes of the GDPR and in relation to the amendments already made to the AI Act (which suffers from similar problems and risks), to introduce:
a) a statutory framework enabling much more flexible regulatory responses to technological developments. The problem with the GDPR and the Omnibus VII proposal in this respect is not the substantive content of the legislation itself, because the GDPR, as a technology-neutral instrument, provides sufficient flexibility in this regard, but rather the inability to provide specific guidance or implementing decisions that would give the providers concerned timely direction on how to proceed so as to minimise the risk of being penalised for the approach they choose;
b) effective measures enabling expedited consultations on specific issues faced by providers of AI systems and models;
c) an acknowledgement, with greater emphasis compare to the current proposal, that in the context of current AI systems (and especially in the context of possible future AGI and self-improving systems), the protection of fundamental rights can realistically be ensured effectively in many cases at the output stage only. This does not mean that regulation should abandon efforts to ensure the protection of fundamental rights at the level of the input data used by such systems and models; however, greater emphasis on reasonably diligent efforts as sufficient evidence of compliance with legal requirements would certainly be appropriate.

One aspect that is somewhat overlooked in debates about the scope of the Omnibus amendments should be highlighted: the continuously stricter interpretation of the GDPR by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the EDPB. Consequently, the current state of the EU regulatory approach to personal data protection cannot, in practical terms, be compared with the position in 2018.

We also welcome the Council’s effort to resolve the somewhat heated debate over the definition of personal data. We consider the solution proposed in Article 25a concerning pseudonymised data to be pragmatic, although it would be appropriate to elaborate certain aspects of this approach more systematically. For example, although the rule set out in Article 25a(2) is reasonable, it is not clear what effect this express statement will have in cases where a third party obtains personal data that have not been pseudonymised (meaning that they have not undergone a specific pseudonymisation process as envisaged by Article 4(5) GDPR and by the wording of proposed Article 25a(1)), but are personal data that are, in themselves, only indirectly identifying.

The present Article 22 (1) regulates a “decision” has has been made as a result of automated processing and that produces a legal effect. In AI language models personal data is, in many cases, processed in a chain of processes after which no clear “decision” is made. We would welcome a wider definition that would expand the scope of Article 22 to include all processing of personal data that is based on automated processing, including profiling.

Among the practical measures set out in the current proposal and the Council’s opinion particularly welcome the initiative to extend deadlines for breach notifications, increase the reporting requirement to “high risk” only, and establish national single entry points for reporting incident notifications under overlapping legal frameworks.

As practical custodians of compliance within organizations, DPOs have gathered extensive experience since the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). We offer this constructive position paper to highlight the realities of breach reporting on the ground and to outline critical recommendations for the upcoming trilogue negotiations.

1. Practical Lessons from GDPR Breach Reporting (Articles 33 and 34)

Experience with the personal data breach reporting regimes under Articles 33 and 34 GDPR across various EU Member States has highlighted structural challenges:

● High Administrative Burden, Unclear Added Value: Rather than serving its original purpose—enabling public authorities to identify systemic privacy risks early and provide swift guidance, warnings, or remedial support—breach reporting has, in many jurisdictions, evolved into an administrative burden.
● The “Black Hole” Effect: Controllers and DPOs devote substantial resources to preparing complex notifications within strict deadlines. In practice, however, these reports frequently disappear into an administrative “black hole,” going unacknowledged for weeks or months, or yielding no feedback or practical guidance whatsoever from Data Protection Authorities (DPAs). Conversely, the concern that the only consequence of notification will be the initiation of an inspection and, potentially, the imposition of a fine causes some controllers to hesitate to notify personal data breaches.
● Misallocation of Resources: This dynamic forces organizations to allocate critical expertise and resources to formalistic reporting tasks during live security incidents, rather than concentrating efforts on incident containment, remediation, and protecting affected individuals.

2. Synergies with NIS-2 and the Need for Streamlined Reporting

With the implementation of the NIS-2 Directive and other sectoral reporting requirements (such as DORA), organizations face a complex web of parallel incident notification regimes.

The EFDPO welcomes the Council’s commitment to facilitating harmonized incident reporting and avoiding duplication. However, to ensure that streamlined reporting translates into operational reality, we emphasize the following core recommendations:

1. Integrated & Consolidated Reporting Regimes: Incident and breach notification requirements under the GDPR, NIS-2, ePrivacy, and related digital frameworks should be merged into a genuinely unified, single-incident reporting mechanism. Organizations should not be required to re-enter the same incident data across multiple regulatory silos.

2. Mandatory 24/7 Operations Centers for Member State Reporting Facilities: Where Member States host single reporting facilities or national entry points, they should be legally mandated to establish and maintain 24/7 Operational Response Capabilities.

○ A reporting mechanism is only as effective as the authority’s capacity to process incoming notices.
○ A dedicated 24/7 Operations Center ensures that incoming notifications are immediately reviewed, potential cross-sectoral or cross-border risks are promptly evaluated, and actionable advice or interventions can be delivered swiftly to affected organizations.

3. Constructive Engagement in Upcoming Trilogues

The EFDPO stands ready to participate actively and constructively in the upcoming negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Commission.

By working together with EU policymakers and supervisory authorities, we can ensure that regulatory simplification achieves its primary objective: eliminating unnecessary bureaucratic friction, fostering European digital innovation and competitiveness, and creating an effective operational ecosystem for cybersecurity and data privacy.

About the EFDPO:

The European Federation of Data Protection Officers (EFDPO) is the umbrella organization for national DPO associations across Europe, representing thousands of privacy professionals who implement EU data protection legislation on a daily basis.